Incident trends report (October 2018 – April 2019)

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This report provides
technical details of some of the most common incident trends observed in the
UK, across all sectors, by the NCSC’s Incident Management Team, in recent
months.

For each incident
type, we also provide detailed technical guidance on how to defend against
them, and recover from them.

This report covers
the period from October 2018 to April 2019.

Sources

The incident types
we explore are not in themselves new, and the guidance we offer is readily
available, both on the NCSC website and from other sources.

However, the
combination of trends and guidance, backed with unique NCSC analysis, provides
targeted and easily actionable advice.

With this
information to hand you should be able to review your security posture and,
where necessary, make improvements.

Adversaries

The trends are
adversary agnostic, with each type of attack used widely by a range of
different cyber adversaries.

All the incident
types noted have resulted in compromises within the UK, some significant in
nature.

Incidents and their mitigation

We cover five main
trends affecting UK organisations.

1. Office365

2. Ransomware

3. Phishing

4. Vulnerability scanning

5. Supply chain attacks

Office 365

Cloud services, and
Office 365 in particular, have become the primary target observed in recent
months.

While traditional
models of on-premise IT services were frequently isolated from the internet,
the widescale move to cloud services has put the IT of many enterprises within
reach of internet-based attacks. In some cases, these services are only
protected by a username and password.

Incident trends

There has been
significant use of tools and scripts to try and guess users’ passwords. This
has almost become the daily norm for Office 365 deployments.

Attacks can now be
mounted at scale across the Internet without ever having a foothold within the
corporate infrastructure. A successful login will give access to corporate data
stored in all Office 365 services. For example, both SharePoint and Exchange
could be compromised, as well as any third-party services an enterprise has
linked to Azure AD.

Password spraying

The most common
attack affecting Office 365 is password spraying, which attempts a small number
of commonly used passwords against multiple accounts over a long period of
time. This doesn’t tend to trigger account lockouts because the limit of failed
attempts is not reached, and as a result can make it much harder for IT
security teams to spot.

In most cases,
attackers aren’t after just one specific account, and using this method can
target a large number of accounts in one organisation without raising any
security suspicion.

Credential stuffing

On a smaller scale,
we have also seen credential stuffing. This takes pairs of usernames and
passwords from leaked data sets and tries them against other services, such as
Office 365.

This is difficult to
detect in logs as an attacker may only need a single attempt to successfully
log in if the stolen details match those of the user’s Office 365 account.

Attacker’s goals

The intent varies
across each of the attacks we see.

Common goals are:

  1. >
    accessing data and inboxes
    this is
    usually for the purposes of intellectual property theft or espionage
  2. >
    using one inbox to add credibility to onward attacks
    whether
    targeting a high-value individual in the same organisation or pivoting to
    another via trusted contacts
  3. >
    traditional network access
    by re-using
    the Office 365 credentials against a corporate VPN service

Any attack will have
a significantly higher impact if the compromised account holds administrator
status.

Further details of
brute force attacks are documented by MITRE.

Office 365 remediation

Where possible,
organisations using Office 365 should, as a minimum, follow the guidance in the
NCSC’s recent advisory and Microsoft’s published security best practices to
better mitigate account compromise.

Organisations should
update their password policies in line with NCSC’s guidance. This will include
the use of Multi-Factor Authentication (sometimes called 2-Factor
Authentication) in line with the NCSC’s MFA guidance for enterprises. This
provides extremely effective protection against username and password theft and
the reuse of such credentials.

Organisations should
also make sure that legacy authentication protocols are disabled/blocked, and
that enough logging is in place to give insight into any attempted or
successful breaches. The NCSC’s LME project may be able to help you set up a
monitoring solution.

Organisations should
also configure the Office 365 service to harden it against common attack
methods, as described in the advisory, and only log on to the service from
trusted devices that are kept updated. Organisations should securely configure
their devices by following the NCSC’s End User Device security principles.

As explained in a
recent NCSC blog post, larger enterprises and the public sector should follow
Microsoft’s detailed configuration guidance. This explains how to implement
some of the recommendations in our advisory and how some optional Microsoft
services can be used to detect and reduce the impact of malicious activity.

Ransomware

Since the WannaCry
and NotPetya attacks of 2017, ransomware attacks against enterprise networks
have continued to rise in number and sophistication. Small, medium and large
organisations across all sectors of industry, academia and government are
regular targets.

Ransomware prevents
organisations from using their computers or accessing their data, typically by
encrypting files and folders via network shares. This causes significant
operational disruption, and the financial impact for organisations can be
devastating. This is especially true for businesses which have a high-degree of
automation, or are very technology dependent.

Incident trends

Historically,
ransomware has been delivered as a standalone attack. Today, attackers are
using their network access to maximise the impact of the ransomware attack.

Network access
allows the attacker to:

  • build an understanding of
    their victim and their ability to pay
  • identify system backups and
    other key systems so that these can be deleted or encrypted, so as to
    cause maximum impact
  • identify and steal
    potentially valuable data
  • ensure that they encrypt as
    much of an organisation’s data as possible

Defences against
ransomware should include security measures which can prevent an attacker
gaining prior access to the network.

Ransomware tools

Cybercrime botnets
such as Emotet, Dridex and Trickbot are commonly used as an initial infection
vector, prior to retrieving and installing the ransomware. We have also seen
some use of Pen-testing tools such as Cobalt Strike.

Ransomware such as
Ryuk, LockerGoga, Bitpaymer and Dharma have been prevalent in recent months. In
many cases it’s difficult to know the root causes of the preceding compromise,
especially when the ransomware can encrypt some of the sources which might be
used for such an analysis.

Cases observed by
the NCSC often tend to have resulted from a trojanised document, sent via
email. The malware will exploit publicly known vulnerabilities and macros in
Microsoft Office documents.

Ransomware remediation

Ransomware can
usually be prevented by following enterprise security good practice. We
describe how to prevent ransomware, and what to do if your organisation is
infected in our Ransomware guidance.

Your approach should
include:

  1. >
    reducing the chances of the initial malware reaching devices
    you should
    prioritise defences against phishing attacks as described in our Phishing
    guidance and our guidance on macro security for Microsoft Office
  2. >
    considering the use of URL reputation services
    including
    those built into your web browser, and Internet service providers.
  3. >
    using email authentication
    via DMARC
    and DNS filtering products is highly recommended – in conjunction with
    Nominet, the NCSC provides a Protective DNS service (PDNS) for government,
    which can prevent organisations from accessing malicious sites hosting
    malware
  4. >
    making it more difficult for ransomware to run
    once
    delivered – as described in our Mitigating Malware guidance
  5. >
    having a tested backup of your data
    it is
    important that your backup is offline, so that it cannot be modified or
    deleted by ransomware. Our Securing Bulk Data guidance discusses the
    importance of knowing what data is most important to you, and how to back
    it up reliably
  6. >
    effective network segregation
    can make it
    more difficult for malware to spread across a network and can therefore
    limit the impact of ransomware attacks – further details can be found in
    the Cyber security design principles, specifically, section 5.1. Our
    preventing lateral movement guidance is also useful.

Phishing

Phishing has been
the most prevalent attack delivery method seen over the last few years, and
particularly in recent months. Just about anyone with an Email address can be a
target.

Incident trends

Specific methods
observed recently by the NCSC include:

  • targeting
    Office 365 credentials
    – the approach here is to persuade users to follow links to
    legitimate-looking login pages, which prompt for O365 credentials. More
    advanced versions of this attack also prompt the user to use MFA
  • sending
    emails from real, but compromised, email accounts
    – quite often this approach
    will exploit an existing email thread or relationship to add a layer of
    authenticity to a spear phish
  • fake login
    pages
    – these
    are dynamically generated, and personalised, pulling the real imagery and
    artwork from the victim’s Office 365 portal
  • using
    Microsoft services

    such as Azure or Office 365 Forms to host fake login pages – these give
    the address bar an added layer of authenticity

Phishing remediation

You should implement
a multi-layered defence against phishing attacks. This will reduce the chances
of a phishing email reaching a user and minimises the impact of those that get
through.

The NCSC’s
recommended approach can be found in our Phishing guidance. This blog from 2016
explains why technical defences should form the majority of your efforts.

Configure Email
anti-spoofing controls such as Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting
and Conformance (DMARC), Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and Domain-Keys
Identified Mail (DKIM). Details on how to configure them can be found on our
website. The NCSC offers a platform for assessing email security compliance
through its Mail Check service.

Vulnerability scanning

Vulnerability
scanning is a common reconnaissance method used to search for open network
ports, identify unpatched, legacy or otherwise vulnerable software and to
identify misconfigurations, all of which could have an effect on security..

Incident trends

We have seen
attackers identify known weaknesses in Internet-facing service which they then
target using tested techniques or ‘exploits’. This approach means the attack is
more likely to work first time, making its detection less likely when using
traditional Intrusion prevention systems (IPS) and on-host security monitoring.

Once an attacker has
a foothold on the edge of your infrastructure, they will then attempt to run
more network scans and re-use stolen credentials to pivot through to the core
network.

Further details of
these scanning techniques are documented by MITRE in these papers on Network
service scanning and Exploiting public facing applications.

Vulnerability scanning remediation

Port scans and
vulnerability scans are normal for any system connected to the Internet. You
should ensure that all internet-facing servers that an attacker might be able
to find are hardened, and the software running on them is fully patched. This
recent blog from the NCSC highlights guidance which can help you to secure your
servers.

We recommend
following our cyber security design principles when designing your network, so
that any initial attack can be easily detected in your logs, and that your
attack surface is minimised to reduce the impact of compromise.

A penetration test
can be a useful way of determining what an attacker scanning for
vulnerabilities could find, and potentially attack. See our penetration testing
guidance for more information, and the CHECK scheme for a list of NCSC-approved
practitioners.

The NCSC provides a
Web Check service that helps public sector organisations find and fix common
vulnerabilities in the websites they manage. Public sector organisations can
register for the Web Check service by following the link in this page.

Supply chain or trusted relationships

Threats introduced
to enterprise networks via their service providers continue to be a major
problem.

Outsourcing –
particularly of IT – often results in external parties and their own networks
being able to access and even reconfigure enterprise services. Your network
will inherit the risk from these connected networks.

Outsourced services
often have administrator access and use remote connections, along with tools
which have a similar footprint to those used by attackers to “live off the
land.” This raises the noise floor for internal SOC teams, making malicious
activity more difficult to detect.

Incident trends

In recent months
there have been several examples of attackers exploiting the connections of
service providers to gain access to enterprise networks.

  • NCSC’s own publication on
    APT10
  • the exploitation of Remote
    Management and Monitoring (RMM) tooling to deploy ransomware, as reported
    by ZDNet
  • the public disclosure of a
    “sophisticated intrusion” at a major outsourced IT vendor, as reported by
    Krebs on Security

Supply chain or trusted relationships remediation

Supply chain
security should be a consideration when procuring both products and services.
Our Supply Chain guidance proposes a series of 12 principles, designed to help
organisations establish effective control and oversight of their supply chain.

Those using
outsourced IT providers should ensure that any remote administration interfaces
used by those service providers are secured, by for example using a
well-configured VPN.

You should ensure
that the way your provider connects to, or administers, your system meets your
own organisation’s security standards. You should take steps to segment and
segregate your networks. This will help to contain the threat if another
customer, who shares the same service provider (or the provider themselves) is
compromised.

Segmentation and
segregation can be achieved physically or logically using access control lists,
network and computer virtualisation, firewalls, and network encryption such as
Internet Protocol Security. Further detailed guidance is available from our partners
at the Australian Cyber Security Centre.

You should document
the remote interfaces and internal accesses in use by your service provider to
ensure that they are fully revoked at the end of the contract. If they have
installed services or software on your network, you should ensure that these can
be easily removed at the end of the contract, as it may not be maintained or
have security patches applied once that company is no longer involved.

If your supply chain
includes the use of cloud services, you should read our blog post describing
how to manage the risk of cloud-enabled products. Our Cloud Security Guidance
will help you determine whether such a service appropriately protects your data
and connected services. Our Software as a Service (SaaS) security guidance,
will help you evaluate the security of the cloud-based applications you intend
to consume.

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